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How to Bootstrap Trust among Devices in Wireless Environments via EAP-STLS

  • Massimiliano Pala
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7868)

Abstract

Wireless networks are becoming the de-facto standard for home communications. Computers, phones, and appliances access broadband internet connections via a common Access Point (AP) directly connected to the ISP network or via phone lines. As we introduce more and more smart devices in our homes, the security and authentication of our “personal devices” is paramount. Regrettably, because of the difficulties in managing user credentials, the vast majority of home environments are secured via Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs). This leads to the usage of long-lived weak passwords for network authentication and data encryption. In this paper we analyze the different possibilities offered by current standards and describe a new authentication mechanism, Simple TLS (EAP-TTLS/EAP-STLS), that allows to bootstrap trust among devices via strong credentials (PK certificates). Our work specifically targets the security of home wireless environments where security is often forfeited in favor of practicality.

Keywords

Smart Card Access Server Mutual Authentication Authentication Server Authentication Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Massimiliano Pala
    • 1
  1. 1.PKI/Trust Labs — CSE DepartmentPolytechnic Institute of NYUBrooklynUSA

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