Highly Accurate Key Extraction Method for Access-Driven Cache Attacks Using Correlation Coefficient

  • Junko Takahashi
  • Toshinori Fukunaga
  • Kazumaro Aoki
  • Hitoshi Fuji
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7959)

Abstract

This paper proposes a new highly-accurate key extraction method for access-driven cache attacks (CAs). We show that a mathematical correlation method can be utilized to evaluate quantitatively the access-driven CAs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on CAs that clarifies precisely and mathematically the key candidate space based on memory allocation, and analyzes quantitatively how the correlation values change based on the number of plaintexts. We show empirical improvement of the proposed method based on real processors. We correctly examine the correlation between the access timing data and the key within a few minutes even in a noisy environment. Based on the proposed method, we show the key candidate space with the mathematical proof and find the relationship between the correlation values and the number of plaintexts needed to examine the required number of plaintexts for a successful attack.

Keywords

Side-Channel Attacks Cache Attacks Access-Driven Cache Attacks Block Ciphers AES Software Implementation 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Junko Takahashi
    • 1
  • Toshinori Fukunaga
    • 2
  • Kazumaro Aoki
    • 1
  • Hitoshi Fuji
    • 1
  1. 1.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesMusashino-shiJapan
  2. 2.NTT Technology Planning DepartmentChiyoda-kuJapan

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