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Detecting Vulnerabilities in Java-Card Bytecode Verifiers Using Model-Based Testing

  • Aymerick Savary
  • Marc Frappier
  • Jean-Louis Lanet
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7940)

Abstract

Java Card security is based on different elements among which the bytecode verifier is one of the most important. Finding vulnerabilities is a complex, tedious and error-prone task. In the case of the Java bytecode verifier, vulnerability tests are typically derived by hand. We propose a new approach to generate vulnerability test suites using model-based testing. Each instruction of the Java bytecode language is represented by an event of an Event-B machine, with a guard that denotes security conditions as defined in the virtual machine specification. We generate vulnerability tests by negating guards of events and generating traces with these faulty events using the ProB model checker. This approach has been applied to a subset of twelve instructions of the bytecode language and tested on five Java Card bytecode verifiers. Vulnerabilities have been found for each of them. We have developed a complete tool chain to support the approach and provide a proof of concept.

Keywords

Model Based Testing Java Card bytecode Verifier Vulnerability Testing Security Event-B 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aymerick Savary
    • 1
    • 2
  • Marc Frappier
    • 1
  • Jean-Louis Lanet
    • 2
  1. 1.University of SherbrookeCanada
  2. 2.University of LimogesFrance

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