Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes

  • Dan Boneh
  • Mark Zhandry
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_35

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7881)
Cite this paper as:
Boneh D., Zhandry M. (2013) Quantum-Secure Message Authentication Codes. In: Johansson T., Nguyen P.Q. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2013. EUROCRYPT 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7881. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg


We construct the first Message Authentication Codes (MACs) that are existentially unforgeable against a quantum chosen message attack. These chosen message attacks model a quantum adversary’s ability to obtain the MAC on a superposition of messages of its choice. We begin by showing that a quantum secure PRF is sufficient for constructing a quantum secure MAC, a fact that is considerably harder to prove than its classical analogue. Next, we show that a variant of Carter-Wegman MACs can be proven to be quantum secure. Unlike the classical settings, we present an attack showing that a pair-wise independent hash family is insufficient to construct a quantum secure one-time MAC, but we prove that a four-wise independent family is sufficient for one-time security.


Quantum computing MAC chosen message attacks post-quantum security 

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan Boneh
    • 1
  • Mark Zhandry
    • 1
  1. 1.Stanford UniversityUSA

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