Sessions and Separability in Security Protocols

  • Marco Carbone
  • Joshua D. Guttman
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7796)

Abstract

Despite much work on sessions and session types in non-adversarial contexts, session-like behavior given an active adversary has not received an adequate definition and proof methods. We provide a syntactic property that guarantees that a protocol has session-respecting executions. Any uncompromised subset of the participants are still guaranteed that their interaction will respect sessions. A protocol transformation turns any protocol into a session-respecting protocol.

We do this via a general theory of separability. Our main theorem applies to different separability requirements, and characterizes when we can separate protocol executions sufficiently to meet a particular requirement. This theorem also gives direct proofs of some old and new protocol composition results. Thus, our theory of separability appears to cover protocol composition and session-like behavior within a uniform framework, and gives a general pattern for reasoning about independence.

Keywords

Sessions Security Protocols Strand Spaces 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Carbone
    • 1
  • Joshua D. Guttman
    • 2
  1. 1.IT University of CopenhagenDenmark
  2. 2.Worcester Polytechnic InstituteUSA

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