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Formal Verification of e-Auction Protocols

  • Jannik Dreier
  • Pascal Lafourcade
  • Yassine Lakhnech
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7796)

Abstract

Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C.. With the rise of Internet, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these electronic transactions. We propose a formal framework to analyze and verify security properties of e-Auction protocols. We model protocols in the Applied π-Calculus and define privacy notions, which include secrecy of bids, anonymity of the participants, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We also discuss fairness, non-repudiation and non-cancellation. Additionally we show on two case studies how these properties can be verified automatically using ProVerif, and discover several attacks.

Keywords

Secret Data Registration Authority Auction Protocol Authentication Property Electronic Auction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jannik Dreier
    • 1
  • Pascal Lafourcade
    • 1
  • Yassine Lakhnech
    • 1
  1. 1.Université Grenoble 1, CNRSVerimagFrance

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