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UVHM: Model Checking Based Formal Analysis Scheme for Hypervisors

  • Yuchao She
  • Hui Li
  • Hui Zhu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7804)

Abstract

Hypervisors act a central role in virtualization for cloud computing. However, current security solutions, such as installing IDS model on hypervisors to detect known and unknown attacks, can not be applied well to the virtualized environments. Whats more, people have not raised enough concern about vulnerabilities of hypervisors themselves. Existing works mainly focusing on hypervisors’ code analysis can only verify the correctness, rather than security, or only be suitable for open-source hypervisors. In this paper, we design a binary analysis tool using formal methods to discover vulnerabilities of hypervisors. In the scheme, Z notation, VDM, B, Object-Z or CSP formalism can be utilized as suitable modeling and specification languages. Our proposal sequently follows the process of disassembly, modeling, specification, and verification. Finally, the effectiveness of the method is demonstrated by detecting the vulnerability of Xen-3.3.0 in which a bug is added.

Keywords

hypervisor security model checking formal analysis 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuchao She
    • 1
  • Hui Li
    • 1
  • Hui Zhu
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks (ISN)Xidian UniversityXi’anP.R. China
  2. 2.Network and Data Security Key Laboratory of Sichuan ProvinceXidian UniversityChengduP.R. China

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