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AppGuard – Enforcing User Requirements on Android Apps

  • Michael Backes
  • Sebastian Gerling
  • Christian Hammer
  • Matteo Maffei
  • Philipp von Styp-Rekowsky
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7795)

Abstract

The success of Android phones makes them a prominent target for malicious software, in particular since the Android permission system turned out to be inadequate to protect the user against security and privacy threats. This work presents AppGuard, a powerful and flexible system for the enforcement of user-customizable security policies on untrusted Android applications. AppGuard does not require any changes to a smartphone’s firmware or root access. Our system offers complete mediation of security-relevant methods based on callee-site inline reference monitoring. We demonstrate the general applicability of AppGuard by several case studies, e.g., removing permissions from overly curious apps as well as defending against several recent real-world attacks on Android phones. Our technique exhibits very little space and runtime overhead. AppGuard is publicly available, has been invited to the Samsung Apps market, and has had more than 500,000 downloads so far.

Keywords

Security Policy Android Application Runtime Overhead Native Code Address Book 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Backes
    • 1
    • 2
  • Sebastian Gerling
    • 1
  • Christian Hammer
    • 1
  • Matteo Maffei
    • 1
  • Philipp von Styp-Rekowsky
    • 1
  1. 1.Saarland UniversitySaarbrückenGermany
  2. 2.Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (MPI-SWS)Germany

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