Towards Verifying Voter Privacy through Unlinkability
The increasing official use of security protocols for electronic voting deepens the need for their trustworthiness, hence for their formal verification. The impossibility of linking a voter to her vote, often called voter privacy or ballot secrecy, is the core property of many such protocols. Most existing work relies on equivalence statements in cryptographic extensions of process calculi. This paper provides the first theorem-proving based verification of voter privacy and overcomes some of the limitations inherent to process calculi-based analysis. Unlinkability between two pieces of information is specified as an extension to the Inductive Method for security protocol verification in Isabelle/HOL. New message operators for association extraction and synthesis are defined. Proving voter privacy demanded substantial effort and provided novel insights into both electronic voting protocols themselves and the analysed security goals. The central proof elements are described and shown to be reusable for different protocols with minimal interaction.
KeywordsE-voting Trustworthy Voting System Privacy Security Protocols Formal Methods
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