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Sender-Equivocable Encryption Schemes Secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks Revisited

  • Zhengan Huang
  • Shengli Liu
  • Baodong Qin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7778)

Abstract

In Eurocrypt 2010, Fehr et al. proposed the first sender-equivocable encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (NC-CCA) and proved that NC-CCA security implies security against selective opening chosen-ciphertext attacks (SO-CCA). The NC-CCA security proof of the scheme relies on security against substitution attacks of a new primitive, “cross-authentication code”. However, the security of cross-authentication code can not be guaranteed when all the keys used in the code are exposed. Our key observation is that in the NC-CCA security game, the randomness used in the generation of the challenge ciphertext is exposed to the adversary. This random information can be used to recover all the keys involved in the cross-authentication code, and forge a ciphertext (like a substitution attack of cross-authentication code) that is different from but related to the challenge ciphertext. And the response of the decryption oracle, with respect to the forged ciphertext, leaks information. This leaked information can be employed by an adversary to spoil the NC-CCA security proof of Fehr et al.’s scheme encrypting multi-bit plaintexts. We also show that Fehr et al.’s scheme encrypting single-bit plaintexts can be refined to achieve NC-CCA security, free of any cross-authentication code.

Keywords

sender-equivocable encryption chosen-ciphertext attack cross-authentication code 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Zhengan Huang
    • 1
  • Shengli Liu
    • 1
  • Baodong Qin
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina
  2. 2.College of Computer Science and TechnologySouthwest University of Science and TechnologyMianyangChina

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