Robust Encryption, Revisited

  • Pooya Farshim
  • Benoît Libert
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
  • Elizabeth A. Quaglia
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7778)

Abstract

We revisit the notions of robustness introduced by Abdalla, Bellare, and Neven (TCC 2010). One of the main motivations for the introduction of strong robustness for public-key encryption (PKE) by Abdalla et al. is to prevent certain types of attack on Sako’s auction protocol. We show, perhaps surprisingly, that Sako’s protocol is still vulnerable to attacks exploiting robustness problems in the underlying PKE scheme, even when it is instantiated with a strongly robust scheme. This demonstrates that current notions of robustness are insufficient even for one of its most natural applications. To address this and other limitations in existing notions, we introduce a series of new robustness notions for PKE and explore their relationships. In particular, we introduce complete robustness, our strongest new notion of robustness, and give a number of constructions for completely robust PKE schemes.

Keywords

Robustness Anonymity Public-key encryption Security proofs 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pooya Farshim
    • 1
  • Benoît Libert
    • 2
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
    • 3
  • Elizabeth A. Quaglia
    • 4
  1. 1.Fachbereich InformatikTechnische Universität DarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.TechnicolorFrance
  3. 3.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonUK
  4. 4.Département d’InformatiqueÉcole Normale SupérieureParisFrance

Personalised recommendations