Non-Interactive Key Exchange

  • Eduarda S. V. Freire
  • Dennis Hofheinz
  • Eike Kiltz
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-36362-7_17

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7778)
Cite this paper as:
Freire E.S.V., Hofheinz D., Kiltz E., Paterson K.G. (2013) Non-Interactive Key Exchange. In: Kurosawa K., Hanaoka G. (eds) Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2013. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7778. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) is a fundamental but much-overlooked cryptographic primitive. It appears as a major contribution in the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman, but NIKE has remained largely unstudied since then. In this paper, we provide different security models for this primitive and explore the relationships between them. We then give constructions for secure NIKE in the Random Oracle Model based on the hardness of factoring and in the standard model based on the hardness of a variant of the decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem for asymmetric pairings. We also study the relationship between NIKE and public key encryption (PKE), showing that a secure NIKE scheme can be generically converted into an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. Our conversion also illustrates the fundamental nature of NIKE in public key cryptography.

Keywords

non-interactive key exchange public-key cryptography pairings 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eduarda S. V. Freire
    • 1
  • Dennis Hofheinz
    • 2
  • Eike Kiltz
    • 3
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
    • 1
  1. 1.Royal Holloway, University of LondonUK
  2. 2.Karlsruhe Institute of TechnologyGermany
  3. 3.Ruhr-Universität BochumGermany

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