Modeling Wizard for Confidential Business Processes

  • Andreas Lehmann
  • Niels Lohmann
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 132)


One driver of business process management is the opportunity to reduce costs by outsourcing certain tasks to third-party organizations. At the same time, it is undesirable that delicate information (e.,g., trade secrets) “leak” to the involved third parties, be it for legal or economic reasons. The absence of such leaks — called noninterference — can be checked automatically. Such a check requires an assignment of each task of the business process as either confidential or public. Drawbacks of this method are that (1) this assignment of every task is cumbersome, (2) an unsuccessful check requires a corrected confidentiality assignment although (3) the diagnosis and correction of information leaks is a nontrivial task. This paper presents a modeling prototype that integrates the noninterference check into the early design phase of an interorganizational business process. It not only allows for instant feedback on confidentiality assignments, but also for an automated completion of partial assignments toward guaranteed noninterference.


Business Process Business Process Management Information Leak Access Control Policy Business Process Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Accorsi, R., Lehmann, A.: Automatic Information Flow Analysis of Business Process Models. In: Barros, A., Gal, A., Kindler, E. (eds.) BPM 2012. LNCS, vol. 7481, pp. 172–187. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Busi, N., Gorrieri, R.: Structural non-interference in elementary and trace nets. Mathematical Structures in Computer Science 19(6), 1065–1090 (2009)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Frau, S., Gorrieri, R., Ferigato, C.: Petri Net Security Checker: Structural Non-interference at Work. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J., Martinelli, F. (eds.) FAST 2008. LNCS, vol. 5491, pp. 210–225. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Denning, D.E., Denning, P.J.: Certification of programs for secure information flow. Commun. ACM 20(7), 504–513 (1977)zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Lampson, B.W.: A note on the confinement problem. Commun. ACM 16(10), 613–615 (1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Lohmann, N., Verbeek, E., Dijkman, R.: Petri Net Transformations for Business Processes – A Survey. In: Jensen, K., van der Aalst, W.M.P. (eds.) ToPNoC II. LNCS, vol. 5460, pp. 46–63. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Gorrieri, R., Vernali, M.: Foundations of security analysis and design vi, pp. 125–151. Springer (2011)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Bryant, R.E.: Graph-based algorithms for Boolean function manipulation. IEEE Trans. Computers C-35(8), 677–691 (1986)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Fahland, D., Favre, C., Koehler, J., Lohmann, N., Völzer, H., Wolf, K.: Analysis on demand: Instantaneous soundness checking of industrial business process models. Data Knowl. Eng. 70(5), 448–466 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Lehmann, A., Fahland, D.: Information flow security for business process models - just one click away. In: BPM Demo 2012 (2012)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Atluri, V., Chun, S.A., Mazzoleni, P.: A chinese wall security model for decentralized workflow systems. In: ACM CCS 2001, pp. 48–57. ACM (2001)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Kang, M.H., Froscher, J.N., Sheth, A.P., Kochut, K., Miller, J.A.: A Multilevel Secure Workflow Management System. In: Jarke, M., Oberweis, A. (eds.) CAiSE 1999. LNCS, vol. 1626, pp. 271–285. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Yildiz, U., Godart, C.: Design and implementation of information flow-sensitive business processes. In: ECOWS 2008, pp. 177–186. IEEE Computer Society (2008)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Barletta, M., Ranise, S., Viganò, L.: A declarative two-level framework to specify and verify workflow and authorization policies in service-oriented architectures. Serv. Oriented Comput. Appl. 5(2), 105–137 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Shafiq, B., Masood, A., Joshi, J., Ghafoor, A.: A role-based access control policy verification framework for real-time systems. In: WORDS 2005, pp. 13–20. IEEE Computer Society (2005)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Juszczyszyn, K.: Verifying enterprise ’s mandatory access control policies with coloured Petri nets. In: WETICE 2003, pp. 184. IEEE Computer Society (2003)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Zhang, Z.L., Hong, F., Xiao, H.J.: Verification of strict integrity policy via Petri nets. In: ICSNC 2006, p. 23. IEEE Computer Society (2006)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Knorr, K.: Multilevel security and information flow in Petri net workflows. Technical report, Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Telecommunication Systems - Modeling and Analysis (2001)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Huang, H., Kirchner, H.: Formal specification and verification of modular security policy based on colored Petri nets. IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 8(6), 852–865 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Barkaoui, K., Ayed, R.B., Boucheneb, H., Hicheur, A.: Verification of workflow processes under multilevel security considerations. In: CRiSIS, pp. 77–84. IEEE (2008)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Attali, I., Caromel, D., Henrio, L., Del Aguila, F.L.: Secured information flow for asynchronous sequential processes. Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci. 180(1), 17–34 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Bossi, A., Focardi, R., Piazza, C., Rossi, S.: Transforming Processes to Check and Ensure Information Flow Security. In: Kirchner, H., Ringeissen, C. (eds.) AMAST 2002. LNCS, vol. 2422, pp. 271–286. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    Harris, W.R., Kidd, N., Chaki, S., Jha, S., Reps, T.W.: Verifying Information Flow Control over Unbounded Processes. In: Cavalcanti, A., Dams, D.R. (eds.) FM 2009. LNCS, vol. 5850, pp. 773–789. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. 24.
    Kovács, M., Seidl, H.: Runtime Enforcement of Information Flow Security in Tree Manipulating Processes. In: Barthe, G., Livshits, B., Scandariato, R. (eds.) ESSoS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7159, pp. 46–59. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Atluri, V., Huang, W.K.: An extended Petri net model for supporting workflow in a multilevel secure environment. In: DBSec 1996. IFIP Conference Proceedings 79, pp. 240–258. Chapman & Hall (1997)Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    Accorsi, R., Wonnemann, C., Dochow, S.: SWAT: A security workflow toolkit for reliably secure process-aware information systems. In: ARES 2011, pp. 692–697. IEEE (2011)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Lehmann, A., Lohmann, N.: Model support for confidential service-oriented business processes. In: ZEUS 2012, Bamberg, Germany (2012)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andreas Lehmann
    • 1
  • Niels Lohmann
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für InformatikUniversität RostockRostockGermany

Personalised recommendations