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Toward a Peircean Theory of Human Learning: Revealing the Misconception of Belief Revision

  • Mary Keeler
  • Uta Priss
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7735)

Abstract

Belief Revision was conceived to model how humans do think, and has found application in machine learning. This paper argues that Peirce’s theory of inquiry conceives how we must think, if we want to keep improving our knowledge. Distinguishing between these two views, psychological (empirical) and pragmatic (normative), is crucial to our improvement of human learning methodology, especially as we develop interactive engagement methods for learning STEM concepts. Examining efforts to model Belief Revision in AI can reveal the limitations of this conceptualization for human learning, due to its misconception of Peirce’s pragmatic theory of inquiry.

Keywords

Conceptual Change Evolutionary Psychology Belief Revision Explanatory Hypothesis Logical Empiricist 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mary Keeler
    • 1
  • Uta Priss
    • 1
  1. 1.Ostfalia University of Applied SciencesWolfenbüttelGermany

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