An Approach to Sustainable Electric Power Allocation Using a Multi-round Multi-unit Combinatorial Auction

  • Naoki Fukuta
  • Takayuki Ito
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7580)

Abstract

In this paper, we present a preliminary idea about applying multi-unit combinatorial auctions to an electric power allocation problem when it includes sustainable power sources and it considers guaranteeing stable continuous use of the supplied power. Multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can be seen as indistinguishable. Theoretically, such mechanisms could be applied for dynamic electricity auctions. We try to illustrate how such a mechanism can be applied to the actual electric power allocation problem when we consider the situation that there are sustainable electric power sources and guaranteeing stable continuous use of them. An approximation mechanism has been applied for a large-scale auction problem to overcome its computational intractability.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Naoki Fukuta
    • 1
  • Takayuki Ito
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Shizuoka UniversityHamamatsuJapan
  2. 2.Nagoya Institute of TechnologyGokiso-choJapan
  3. 3.Tokyo UniversityBunkyo-kuJapan

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