Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks

  • Aron Laszka
  • Dávid Szeszlér
  • Levente Buttyán
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 105)


In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.


game theory adversarial games network robustness directed graph strength graph persistence access networks sensor networks 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Altman, E., Boulogne, T., El-Azouzi, R., Jimenez, T., Wynter, L.: A survey on networking games in telecommunications. Computers & Operations Research 33(2), 286–311 (2006)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Felegyhazi, M., Hubaux, J.P.: Game theory in wireless networks: A tutorial. Technical Report LCA-REPORT-2006-002, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland (June 2007)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Charilas, D.E., Panagopoulos, A.D.: A survey on game theory applications in wireless networks. Computer Networks 54(18), 3421–3430 (2010)CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Gueye, A., Walrand, J.C., Anantharam, V.: Design of Network Topology in an Adversarial Environment. In: Alpcan, T., Buttyán, L., Baras, J.S. (eds.) GameSec 2010. LNCS, vol. 6442, pp. 1–20. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Gueye, A., Walrand, J.C., Anantharam, V.: How to Choose Communication Links in an Adversarial Environment? In: Jain, R., Kannan, R. (eds.) GameNets 2011. LNICST, vol. 75, pp. 233–248. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Cunningham, W.H.: Optimal attack and reinforcement of a network. Journal of the ACM 32(3), 549–561 (1985)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Laszka, A., Buttyán, L., Szeszlér, D.: Optimal selection of sink nodes in wireless sensor networks in adversarial environments. In: Proc. of the 12th IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia, WoWMoM 2011, Lucca, Italy, pp. 1–6 (June 2011)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aron Laszka
    • 1
  • Dávid Szeszlér
    • 2
  • Levente Buttyán
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Telecommunications, Laboratory of Cryptography and System SecurityBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsHungary
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and Information TheoryBudapest University of Technology and EconomicsHungary

Personalised recommendations