Game-theoretic Robustness of Many-to-one Networks
In this paper, we study the robustness of networks that are characterized by many-to-one communications (e.g., access networks and sensor networks) in a game-theoretic model. More specifically, we model the interactions between a network operator and an adversary as a two player zero-sum game, where the network operator chooses a spanning tree in the network, the adversary chooses an edge to be removed from the network, and the adversary’s payoff is proportional to the number of nodes that can no longer reach a designated node through the spanning tree. We show that the payoff in every Nash equilibrium of the game is equal to the reciprocal of the persistence of the network. We describe optimal adversarial and operator strategies and give efficient, polynomial-time algorithms to compute optimal strategies. We also generalize our game model to include varying node weights, as well as attacks against nodes.
Keywordsgame theory adversarial games network robustness directed graph strength graph persistence access networks sensor networks
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 2.Felegyhazi, M., Hubaux, J.P.: Game theory in wireless networks: A tutorial. Technical Report LCA-REPORT-2006-002, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland (June 2007)Google Scholar
- 7.Laszka, A., Buttyán, L., Szeszlér, D.: Optimal selection of sink nodes in wireless sensor networks in adversarial environments. In: Proc. of the 12th IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia, WoWMoM 2011, Lucca, Italy, pp. 1–6 (June 2011)Google Scholar