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3kf9: Enhancing 3GPP-MAC beyond the Birthday Bound

  • Liting Zhang
  • Wenling Wu
  • Han Sui
  • Peng Wang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7658)

Abstract

Among various cryptographic schemes, CBC-based MACs belong to the few ones most widely used in practice. Such MACs iterate a blockcipher E K in the so called Cipher-Block-Chaining way, i.e. C i  = E K (M i  ⊕ C i − 1) , offering high efficiency in practical applications. In the paper, we propose a new deterministic variant of CBC-based MACs that is provably secure beyond the birthday bound. The new MAC 3kf9 is obtained by combining f9 (3GPP-MAC) and EMAC sharing the same internal structure, and so it is almost as efficient as the original CBC MAC. 3kf9 offers \(O(\frac{l^3q^3}{2^{2n}}+\frac{lq}{2^n})\) PRF-security when its underlying n-bit blockcipher is pseudorandom with three independent keys. This makes it more secure than traditional CBC-based MACs, especially when they are applied with lightweight blockciphers. Therefore, 3kf9 is expected to be a possible candidate MAC in resource-restricted environments.

Keywords

MAC Birthday Bound CBC Mode of Operation 

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Liting Zhang
    • 2
  • Wenling Wu
    • 1
  • Han Sui
    • 2
  • Peng Wang
    • 2
  1. 1.State Key Laboratory of Information SecurityInstitute of Software, Chinese Academy of SciencesChina
  2. 2.Institute of Information EngineeringChinese Academy of SciencesChina

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