Double-SP Is Weaker Than Single-SP: Rebound Attacks on Feistel Ciphers with Several Rounds

  • Yu Sasaki
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7668)

Abstract

The current paper presents rebound attacks on generalized Feistel network (GFN) with double-SP functions, and show that double-SP functions are weaker than single-SP functions when a number of rounds is small. In 2011, Bogdanov and Shibutani showed that double-SP functions for R rounds could generate more active bytes than single-SP functions for 2R rounds, when R approaches to infinity. Hence, double-SP functions resist the differential and linear attacks more efficiently than single-SP functions. However, in practice, R is relatively small, and thus a comparison with dedicated attacks is also important. For 4-branch type-2 GFN with single-SP functions, the current best attack is up to 11 rounds (22 SP-layers) while no result exists for double-SP functions. In this paper, we present the first cryptanalysis for 4-branch type-2 GFN with double-SP functions. Up to 6 rounds (24 SP-layers), we can find near-collisions when such functions are instantiated in compression function modes, e.g. Davies-Meyer mode. The attack is extended to 7 rounds (28 SP-layers) with respect to a non-ideal property. The important knowledge provided with this paper is that including more active bytes does not immediately indicate stronger security. This is because attackers may control behaviors of several active S-boxes and mount efficient attacks.

Keywords

rebound attack generalized Feistel network double-SP single-SP near-collision known-key distinguisher (controlled) active S-box 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yu Sasaki
    • 1
  1. 1.NTT Secure Platform LaboratoriesNTT CorporationMusashino-shiJapan

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