Multi Criteria Operators for Multi-attribute Auctions

  • Albert Pla
  • Beatriz Lopez
  • Javier Murillo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7647)


Multi-attribute auctions allow agents to sell and purchase goods and services taking into account more attributes besides the price (e.g. service time, tolerances, qualities, etc.). The coexistence of different attributes in the auction mechanism increases the difficulty of determining the winner and its payment. multi-criteria functions can be used to deal with the problem of determining the auction winner. However, in order to make the payment possible, multi criteria functions must fulfill certain conditions. In this paper we discuss which properties must satisfy a multi-criteria function so it can be used to determine the winner of a multi-attribute auction and we experimentally show how the valuation function choice conditions the behavior of the auction mechanism.


Multi-attribute auctions Resource allocation 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Albert Pla
    • 1
  • Beatriz Lopez
    • 1
  • Javier Murillo
    • 2
  1. 1.Unviersity of GironaGironaSpain
  2. 2.NewroniaGironaSpain

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