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Computing the Nash Equilibria of Intruder Classification Games

  • Lemonia Dritsoula
  • Patrick Loiseau
  • John Musacchio
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7638)

Abstract

We investigate the problem of classifying an intruder of two different types (spy or spammer). The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks a network defender observes during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a known distribution) his main target: the mail server. The spy strategically selects the number of attacks on his main target: the file server. The defender strategically selects his classification policy: a threshold on the number of file server attacks. We first develop parameterized families of payoff functions for both players and analyze the Nash equilibria of the noncooperative nonzero-sum game. We analyze the strategic interactions of the two players and the tradeoffs each one of them faces: The defender chooses a classification threshold that balances the cost of missed detections and false alarms while the spy seeks to hit the file server as much as possible while still evading detection. We give a characterization of the Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, and demonstrate how the Nash equilibria can be computed in polynomial time. We give two examples of the general model, one that involves forensics on the side of the defender and one that does not. Finally, we evaluate how investments in forensics and data logging could improve the Nash equilibrium payoff of the defender.

Keywords

Nash equilibria intruder classification polynomial complexity 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Lemonia Dritsoula
    • 1
  • Patrick Loiseau
    • 2
  • John Musacchio
    • 1
  1. 1.UC Santa CruzSanta CruzUSA
  2. 2.EURECOMSophia-AntipolisFrance

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