Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions

  • Serdar Erbatur
  • Santiago Escobar
  • Deepak Kapur
  • Zhiqiang Liu
  • Christopher Lynch
  • Catherine Meadows
  • José Meseguer
  • Paliath Narendran
  • Sonia Santiago
  • Ralf Sasse
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7459)

Abstract

We address a problem that arises in cryptographic protocol analysis when the equational properties of the cryptosystem are taken into account: in many situations it is necessary to guarantee that certain terms generated during a state exploration are in normal form with respect to the equational theory. We give a tool-independent methodology for state exploration, based on unification and narrowing, that generates states that obey these irreducibility constraints, called contextual symbolic reachability analysis, prove its soundness and completeness, and describe its implementation in the Maude-NPA protocol analysis tool. Contextual symbolic reachability analysis also introduces a new type of unification mechanism, which we call asymmetric unification, in which any solution must leave the right side of the solution irreducible. We also present experiments showing the effectiveness of our methodology.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Serdar Erbatur
    • 1
  • Santiago Escobar
    • 2
  • Deepak Kapur
    • 3
  • Zhiqiang Liu
    • 4
  • Christopher Lynch
    • 4
  • Catherine Meadows
    • 5
  • José Meseguer
    • 6
  • Paliath Narendran
    • 1
  • Sonia Santiago
    • 2
  • Ralf Sasse
    • 6
  1. 1.University at Albany-SUNYAlbanyUSA
  2. 2.DSIC-ELPUniversitat Politècnica de ValènciaSpain
  3. 3.University of New MexicoAlbuquerqueUSA
  4. 4.Clarkson UniversityPotsdamUSA
  5. 5.Naval Research LaboratoryWashingtonUSA
  6. 6.University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignUSA

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