Robust Probabilistic Fake Packet Injection for Receiver-Location Privacy in WSN

  • Ruben Rios
  • Jorge Cuellar
  • Javier Lopez
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7459)


The singular communication model in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) originate pronounced traffic patterns that allow a local observer to deduce the location of the base station, which must be kept secret for both strategical and security reasons. In this work we present a new receiver-location privacy solution called HISP (Homogenous Injection for Sink Privacy). Our scheme is based on the idea of hiding the flow of real traffic by carefully injecting fake traffic to homogenize the transmissions from a node to its neighbors. This process is guided by a lightweight probabilistic approach ensuring that the adversary cannot decide with sufficient precision in which direction to move while maintaining a moderate amount of fake traffic. Our system is both validated analytically and experimentally through simulations.


Sensor Network Sensor Node Wireless Sensor Network Source Node Hearing Range 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruben Rios
    • 1
  • Jorge Cuellar
    • 2
  • Javier Lopez
    • 1
  1. 1.Network, Information and Computer Security (NICS) LabUniversity of MalagaSpain
  2. 2.Siemens AGMunichGermany

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