Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs

  • Gilles Barthe
  • Benjamin Grégoire
  • Santiago Zanella Béguelin
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7460)
Cite this paper as:
Barthe G., Grégoire B., Zanella Béguelin S. (2012) Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs. In: Miné A., Schmidt D. (eds) Static Analysis. SAS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7460. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Provable security [6] is at the heart of modern cryptography. It advocates a mathematical approach in which the security of new cryptographic constructions is defined rigorously, and provably reduced to one or several assumptions, such as the hardness of a computational problem, or the existence of an ideal functionality. A typical provable security statement is of the form: for all adversary \(\mathcal{A}\) against the cryptographic construction \(\mathcal{S}\), there exists an adversary \(\mathcal{B}\) against a security assumption \(\mathcal{H}\), such that if \(\mathcal{A}\) has a high probability of breaking the scheme \(\mathcal{S}\) in time t, then \(\mathcal{B}\) has a high probability of breaking the assumption \(\mathcal{H}\) in time t′ (defined as a function of t).

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gilles Barthe
    • 1
  • Benjamin Grégoire
    • 2
  • Santiago Zanella Béguelin
    • 3
  1. 1.IMDEA Software InstituteSpain
  2. 2.INRIA Sophia Antipolis - MéditerranéeFrance
  3. 3.Microsoft ResearchUK

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