Compiler Assisted Masking

  • Andrew Moss
  • Elisabeth Oswald
  • Dan Page
  • Michael Tunstall
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7428)
Cite this paper as:
Moss A., Oswald E., Page D., Tunstall M. (2012) Compiler Assisted Masking. In: Prouff E., Schaumont P. (eds) Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems – CHES 2012. CHES 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7428. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks find a statistical correlation between the power consumption of a cryptographic device and intermediate values within the computation. Randomization via (Boolean) masking of intermediate values breaks this statistical dependence and thus prevents such attacks (at least up to a certain order). Especially for software implementations, (first-order) masking schemes are popular in academia and industry, albeit typically not as the sole countermeasure. The current practice then is to manually ‘insert’ Boolean masks: essentially software developers need to manipulate low-level assembly language to implement masking. In this paper we make a first step to automate this process, at least for first-order Boolean masking, allowing the development of compilers capable of protecting programs against DPA.

Keywords

Compiler assisted cryptography masking DPA 

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew Moss
    • 1
  • Elisabeth Oswald
    • 2
  • Dan Page
    • 2
  • Michael Tunstall
    • 2
  1. 1.School of ComputingBlekinge Institute of TechnologyKarlskronaSweden
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BristolBristolUnited Kingdom

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