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Practical Leakage-Resilient Symmetric Cryptography

  • Sebastian Faust
  • Krzysztof Pietrzak
  • Joachim Schipper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7428)

Abstract

Leakage resilient cryptography attempts to incorporate side-channel leakage into the black-box security model and designs cryptographic schemes that are provably secure within it. Informally, a scheme is leakage-resilient if it remains secure even if an adversary learns a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the schemes internal state. Unfortunately, most leakage resilient schemes are unnecessarily complicated in order to achieve strong provable security guarantees. As advocated by Yu et al. [CCS’10], this mostly is an artefact of the security proof and in practice much simpler construction may already suffice to protect against realistic side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show that indeed for simpler constructions leakage-resilience can be obtained when we aim for relaxed security notions where the leakage-functions and/or the inputs to the primitive are chosen non-adaptively. For example, we show that a three round Feistel network instantiated with a leakage resilient PRF yields a leakage resilient PRP if the inputs are chosen non-adaptively (This complements the result of Dodis and Pietrzak [CRYPTO’10] who show that if a adaptive queries are allowed, a superlogarithmic number of rounds is necessary.) We also show that a minor variation of the classical GGM construction gives a leakage resilient PRF if both, the leakage-function and the inputs, are chosen non-adaptively.

Keywords

Block Cipher Stream Cipher Random Input Security Proof Round Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sebastian Faust
    • 1
  • Krzysztof Pietrzak
    • 2
  • Joachim Schipper
    • 2
  1. 1.Århus UniversityDenmark
  2. 2.IST AustriaAustria

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