On the Side-Effects of Introducing E-Voting

  • James Heather
  • Morgan Llewellyn
  • Vanessa Teague
  • Roland Wen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7187)


The literature abounds with discussions on the relative security merits of various voting systems, and on whether a move towards electronic voting is, from a security perspective, something to be encouraged or discouraged. Little has been said, however, on whether there would be unintended side-effects of changing the voting technology, in terms of the votes cast. Security issues aside, should we expect the introduction of an electronic voting system to affect the results of the election?

This paper attempts to tease out some of the possible effects, by analysing ballot data from the 2008 Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Legislative Assembly Election.


Voter Behaviour Vote Share Polling Place Australian Capital Territory Electronic Vote 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • James Heather
    • 1
  • Morgan Llewellyn
    • 2
  • Vanessa Teague
    • 3
  • Roland Wen
    • 4
  1. 1.Department of ComputingUniversity of SurreyGuildfordUK
  2. 2.IMT LuccaItaly
  3. 3.Dept. Computer Science and Software EngineeringThe University of MelbourneAustralia
  4. 4.The University of New South WalesSydneyAustralia

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