Prêt á Voter with Write-Ins

  • Steve Schneider
  • Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan
  • Chris Culnane
  • James Heather
  • Zhe Xia
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7187)


This paper presents an extension of the Prêt à Voter verifiable voting system to handle write-ins. This is achieved by introducing an additional ‘Write-In’ option and allowing the voter optionally to enter a write-in candidate of their choice. The voter obtains a receipt which includes their write-in, but that receipt does not indicate whether the write-in candidate was selected or not. The system provides flexibility with respect to the tallying of write-in votes. We also introduce null ballots in order to achieve receipt-freeness with respect to write-ins.


end-to-end verifiable voting Prêt à Voter write-in votes receipt-freeness 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steve Schneider
    • 1
  • Sriramkrishnan Srinivasan
    • 1
  • Chris Culnane
    • 1
  • James Heather
    • 1
  • Zhe Xia
    • 1
  1. 1.University of SurreyGuildfordUK

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