Feasibility Analysis of Prêt à Voter for German Federal Elections

  • Denise Demirel
  • Maria Henning
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
  • Steve Schneider
  • Melanie Volkamer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7187)


Prêt à Voter is one of the most well-known and most extensively analysed electronic voting systems for polling stations. However, an analysis from a legal point of view has not yet been conducted. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the readiness of Prêt à Voter for legally binding federal elections in Germany. This case is of particular interest as Germany has with the Constitutional Court Decision from 2009 probably the most restrictive requirements on electronic voting in particular regarding the public nature of elections and verifiability respectively. While many aspects are analysed, some remain open for further legal and technical discussions. Thus, a final decision is not yet possible. Aspects analysed are the ballot paper layout, different processes from ballot printing through to the publishing of results, as well as verifiability, and the overall election management.


Verifiable Elections Legal Requirements German Federal Elections Prêt à Voter Election System Design 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Bundesverfassungsgericht: Judgment. BVerfGE 1, 208–261 (April 1952),
  2. 2.
    Bundesverfassungsgericht: Judgment. BVerfGE 13, 1–20 (May 1961),
  3. 3.
    Bundesverfassungsgericht: Judgment. BVerfGE 14, 154 (June 1962)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bundesverfassungsgericht: Judgment. BVerfGE 29, 154–165 (October 1970)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Bundesverfassungsgericht: Judgment. BVerfGE 123, 39–88 (March 2009),
  6. 6.
    Bundeswahlleiter, D.: Wahl zum 17. Deutschen Bundestag am 27. September 2009, Heft 5, Textliche Auswertung der Wahlergebnisse (November 2010),
  7. 7.
    Chaum, D., Ryan, P.Y.A., Schneider, S.: A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme. In: De Capitani di Vimercati, S., Syverson, P.F., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 118–139. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Rivest, R.L.: Making mix nets robust for electronic voting by randomized partial checking. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 339–353 (2002)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Neff, C.A.: A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to e-voting. In: ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 116–125 (2001)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Park, C., Itoh, K., Kurosawa, K.: Efficient Anonymous Channel and All/Nothing Election Scheme. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 248–259. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Ryan, P.Y.A., Bismark, D., Heather, J., Schneider, S., Xia, Z.: Prêt à Voter: a voter-verifiable voting system. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 4(4), 662–673 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Ryan, P.: Prêt à Voter with Paillier encryption. Journal of Mathematical and Computer Modelling 48(9-10), 1646–1662 (2008)zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-Free Mix-Type Voting Scheme - A Practical Solution to the Implementation of a Voting Booth. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Schreiber, W.: Bundeswahlgesetz Kommentar. Carl Heymanns Verlag (March 2009)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Xia, Z., Schneider, S.A., Heather, J., Ryan, P.Y.A., Lundin, D., Peel, R., Howard, P.: Prêt à voter: All-in-one. In: Proceedings of IAVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE 2007), Ottawa, Canada, pp. 47–56 (2007)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Denise Demirel
    • 1
  • Maria Henning
    • 2
  • Peter Y. A. Ryan
    • 3
  • Steve Schneider
    • 4
  • Melanie Volkamer
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Advanced Security ResearchTechnische Universität DarmstadtDarmstadtGermany
  2. 2.Project Group Constitutionally Compatible Technology Design (provet)Universität KasselGermany
  3. 3.Interdisciplinary Centre for Security and TrustUniversity of LuxembourgLuxembourg
  4. 4.University of SurreyUnited Kingdom

Personalised recommendations