Advertisement

An Efficient Negotiation Protocol to Achieve Socially Optimal Allocation

  • Jianye Hao
  • Ho-fung Leung
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7455)

Abstract

Negotiation-based resource allocation among agents is an important topic in multi-agent system research and it can be applied in various practical domains including network bandwidth allocation, robotics and grid computing. However, it is quite challenging to achieve efficient negotiation due to the huge space of all possible deals. A number of negotiation protocols have been proposed to guide the agents to reach desirable allocations over resources. However, previous work puts too much constraints on the negotiation environment and thus limits its applicability. To address this limitation, we present an efficient protocol within a more general negotiation framework, which can lead agents to achieve socially optimal allocation. We theoretically prove that the final allocation is guaranteed to be socially optimal provided that the agents are altruistic-individually rational. Besides, extensive simulation results show that the complexities of the negotiation process are greatly reduced under our protocol from both communication and computational aspects.

Keywords

Utility Function Leaf Node Child Node Optimal Allocation Negotiation Process 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Arrow, K.J., Sen, A.K., Suzumura, K.: Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare. North-Holland (2002)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: Fair division: from cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge University Press (1996)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Brams, S.J., Taylor, A.D.: The Win-Win Solution: Guaranteeing Fair Shares to Everybody. W.W. Norton and Company (2000)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Maudet, N.: Tractable negotiation in tree-structured domains. In: AAMAS 2006, pp. 362–369 (2006)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Maudet, N.: Simple negotiation schemes for agents with simple preferences: sufficiency, necessity and maximality. AAMAS 20(2), 234–259 (2010)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Chevaleyre, Y., Dunne, P.E., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Lemaître, M., Maudet, N., Padget, J., Phelps, S., Rodríguez-aguilar, J.A., Sousa, P.: Issues in multiagent resource allocation. Informatica 30, 3–31 (2006)MATHGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Endriss, U., Maudet, N.: Welfare Engineering in Multiagent Systems. In: Omicini, A., Petta, P., Pitt, J. (eds.) ESAW 2003. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 3071, pp. 93–106. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Endriss, U., Maudet, N.: On the communication complexity of multilateral trading: Extended report. AAMAS 11, 91–107 (2005)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Endriss, U., Maudet, N., Sadri, F., Toni, F.: On optimal outcomes of negotiation over resources. In: AAMAS 2003 (2003)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Gomoluch, J., Schroeder, M.: Market-based resource allocation for grid computing: A model and simulation. In: MGC 2003, pp. 211–218 (2003)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Maly, K., Overstreet, C., Qiu, X., Tang, D.: Dynamic bandwidth allocation in a network. In: Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Communications Architectures and Protocols (1988)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Rosenschein, J.S., Zlotkin, G.: Rules of Encounter. MIT Press (1994)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Rubinstein, A.: Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50(1), 97–110 (1982)MathSciNetMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Saha, S., Sen, S.: An efficient protocol for negotiation over multiple indivisible resources. In: IJCAI 2007, pp. 1494–1499 (2007)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Sandholm, T.W.: Contract types for satisficing task allocation: I theoretical result. In: AAAI Spring Symposium: Satisficing Models (1998)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jianye Hao
    • 1
  • Ho-fung Leung
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringThe Chinese University of Hong KongHong Kong

Personalised recommendations