How to Compute under \({\mathcal {\varvec{AC}}}^\mathbf{0}\) Leakage without Secure Hardware

  • Guy N. Rothblum
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7417)

Abstract

We study the problem of computing securely in the presence of leakage on the computation’s internals. Our main result is a general compiler that compiles any algorithm P, viewed as a boolean circuit, into a functionally equivalent algorithm \(P'\). The compiled \(P'\) can then be run repeatedly on adversarially chosen inputs in the presence of leakage on its internals: In each execution of \(P'\), an \({\mathcal {AC}}^{0}\) adversary can (adaptively) choose any leakage function that can be computed in \({\mathcal {AC}}^{0}\) and has bounded output length, apply it to the values on \(P'\)’s internal wires in that execution, and view its output. We show that no such leakage adversary can learn more than P’s input-output behavior. In particular, the internals of P are protected.

Security does not rely on any secure hardware, and is proved under a computational intractability assumption regarding the hardness of computing inner products for \({\mathcal {AC}}^{0}\) circuits with pre-processing. This new assumption has connections to long-standing open problems in complexity theory.

Keywords

Security Proof Secret State Side Channel Attack Boolean Circuit Original Circuit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guy N. Rothblum
    • 1
  1. 1.Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley CampusMountain ViewUSA

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