Impossibility Results for Static Input Secure Computation

  • Sanjam Garg
  • Abishek Kumarasubramanian
  • Rafail Ostrovsky
  • Ivan Visconti
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7417)

Abstract

Consider a setting of two mutually distrustful parties Alice and Bob who want to securely evaluate some function on pre-specified inputs. The well studied notion of two-party secure computation allows them to do so in the stand-alone setting. Consider a deterministic function (e.g., 1-out-of-2 bit OT) that Alice and Bob can not evaluate trivially and which allows only Bob to receive the output. We show that Alice and Bob can not securely compute any such function in the concurrent setting even when their inputs are pre-specified. Our impossibility result also extends to all deterministic functions in which both Alice and Bob get the same output. Our results have implications in the bounded-concurrent setting as well.

Keywords

Secure Computation Impossibility Result Oblivious Transfer Auxiliary Input Honest Party 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sanjam Garg
    • 1
  • Abishek Kumarasubramanian
    • 1
  • Rafail Ostrovsky
    • 1
  • Ivan Visconti
    • 2
  1. 1.UCLALos AngelesUSA
  2. 2.University of SalernoFiscianoItaly

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