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Truthful Multi-unit Double Auction for Spectrum Allocation in Wireless Communications

  • He Huang
  • Yu-e Sun
  • Kai Xing
  • Hongli Xu
  • Xueyong Xu
  • Liusheng Huang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7405)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a truthful multi-unit double auction scheme for the scenarios that multiple buyers/sellers have different demands to buy/sell, which involves a series of bid-related buyer group construction and winner determination strategies. In the analysis, we show the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed scheme and prove that it improves the spectrum reusability and is truthful. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first multi-unit double auction approach for wireless spectrum allocation.

Keywords

spectrum allocation multi-unit double auction 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • He Huang
    • 1
  • Yu-e Sun
    • 2
  • Kai Xing
    • 3
  • Hongli Xu
    • 3
  • Xueyong Xu
    • 3
  • Liusheng Huang
    • 3
  1. 1.Computer Science and TechnologySoochow UniversityRepublic of China
  2. 2.Urban Rail TransportationSoochow UniversityRepublic of China
  3. 3.Computer Science and TechnologyUniversity of Science and Technology of ChinaHefeiChina

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