Computing Strong Game-Theoretic Strategies in Jotto

  • Sam Ganzfried
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7168)

Abstract

We develop a new approach that computes approximate equilibrium strategies in Jotto, a popular word game. Jotto is an extremely large two-player game of imperfect information; its game tree has many orders of magnitude more states than games previously studied, including no-limit Texas Hold’em. To address the fact that the game is so large, we propose a novel strategy representation called oracular form, in which we do not explicitly represent a strategy, but rather appeal to an oracle that quickly outputs a sample move from the strategy’s distribution. Our overall approach is based on an extension of the fictitious play algorithm to this oracular setting. We demonstrate the superiority of our computed strategies over the strategies computed by a benchmark algorithm, both in terms of head-to-head and worst-case performance.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Game State Game Tree 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sam Ganzfried
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentCarnegie Mellon UniversityUSA

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