Exploring the Ecosystem of Referrer-Anonymizing Services

  • Nick Nikiforakis
  • Steven Van Acker
  • Frank Piessens
  • Wouter Joosen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7384)

Abstract

The constant expansion of the World Wide Web allows users to enjoy a wide range of products and services delivered directly to their browsers. At the same time however, this expansion of functionality is usually coupled with more ways of attacking a user’s security and privacy. In this arms race, certain web-services present themselves as privacy-preserving or privacy-enhancing. One type of such services is a Referrer-Anonymizing Service (RAS), a service which relays users from a source site to a destination site while scrubbing the contents of the referrer header from user requests.

In this paper, we investigate the ecosystem of RASs and how they interact with web-site administrators and visiting users. We discuss their workings, what happens behind the scenes and how top Internet sites react to traffic relayed through such services. In addition, we present user statistics from our own Referrer-Anonymizing Service and show the leakage of private information by others towards advertising agencies as well as towards ‘curious’ RAS owners.

Keywords

referrer anonymization online ecosystem 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nick Nikiforakis
    • 1
  • Steven Van Acker
    • 1
  • Frank Piessens
    • 1
  • Wouter Joosen
    • 1
  1. 1.IBBT-DistriNetKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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