Computational Complexity of Traffic Hijacking under BGP and S-BGP

  • Marco Chiesa
  • Giuseppe Di Battista
  • Thomas Erlebach
  • Maurizio Patrignani
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7392)


Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP, the secure variant of BGP that is being deployed, is not fully able to blunt traffic attraction attacks. Given a traffic flow between two ASes, we study how difficult it is for a malicious AS to devise a strategy for hijacking or intercepting that flow. We show that this problem marks a sharp difference between BGP and S-BGP. Namely, while it is solvable, under reasonable assumptions, in polynomial time for the type of attacks that are usually performed in BGP, it is NP-hard for S-BGP. Our study has several by-products. E.g., we solve a problem left open in the literature, stating when performing a hijacking in S-BGP is equivalent to performing an interception.


Autonomous System Intermediate Structure Good Class Successful Attack Attack Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marco Chiesa
    • 1
  • Giuseppe Di Battista
    • 1
  • Thomas Erlebach
    • 2
  • Maurizio Patrignani
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer Science and AutomationRoma Tre UniversityItaly
  2. 2.Dept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of LeicesterUK

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