Comparing Traffic Discrimination Policies in an Agent-Based Next-Generation Network Market

Chapter
First Online:
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 662)

Abstract

Presently, the network neutrality paradigm governs the manner in which most data is transported over the Internet. However, experts often question whether keeping such a policy remains reasonable. In the context of new technologies, such as all-IP Next Generation Networks (NGN), traffic discrimination promises to benefit both network providers and users, but also imposes risks. We develop an agent-based NGN market model, in order to investigate the effects of neutral and non-neutral traffic management policies on the performance of Internet market participants. A simulation-based analysis of different policy and competition scenarios suggests that content providers perform best when network neutrality is imposed, while network providers and consumers may benefit from traffic discrimination, under certain circumstances.

Keywords

Service Quality Federal Communication Commission Network Congestion Content Provider Network User 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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