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TreVisor

OS-Independent Software-Based Full Disk Encryption Secure against Main Memory Attacks
  • Tilo Müller
  • Benjamin Taubmann
  • Felix C. Freiling
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7341)

Abstract

Software-based disk encryption techniques store necessary keys in main memory and are therefore vulnerable to DMA and cold boot attacks which can acquire keys from RAM. Recent research results have shown operating system dependent ways to overcome these attacks. For example, the TRESOR project patches Linux to store AES keys solely on the microprocessor. We present TreVisor, the first software-based and OS-independent solution for full disk encryption that is resistant to main memory attacks. It builds upon BitVisor, a thin virtual machine monitor which implements various security features. Roughly speaking, TreVisor adds the encryption facilities of TRESOR to BitVisor, i. e., we move TRESOR one layer below the operating system into the hypervisor such that secure disk encryption runs transparently for the guest OS. We have tested its compatibility with both Linux and Windows and show positive security and performance results.

Keywords

Advance Encryption Standard Trust Platform Module Virtual Machine Monitor Guest Operating System USENIX Security Symposium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tilo Müller
    • 1
  • Benjamin Taubmann
    • 1
  • Felix C. Freiling
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceFriedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-NurembergGermany

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