Solids - A Combinatorial Auction for a Housing Corporation
On May 7, 2011, over one hundred bidders took part in a combinatorial auction for housing space in a newly erected building in Amsterdam (the Netherlands). This paper describes the development of this auction. We sketch our collaboration with the housing corporation that resulted in design choices with respect to first/second price, feedback, number of rounds, and tractability of the combinatorial auction. Furthermore, the winner determination problem is complicated by various municipal and building regulations that the allocation needs to satisfy. We show how these regulations can be included in an integer program that is used to solve the winner determination problem. Finally, computational experiments illustrate the tractability of this model.
Keywordscombinatorial auction housing auction design integer program
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Solids: an introduction, http://www.solids.nl/english
- 2.Bijdendijk, F.: Met andere ogen. Het Oosten Woningcorporatie, Amsterdam (2006)Google Scholar
- 3.Cramton, P., Steinberg, R., Shoham, Y.: Combinatorial auctions. MIT Press (2005)Google Scholar
- 7.Goossens, D.R., Spieksma, F.C.R.: Design Study Solids-veiling (2010) (Confidential, in Dutch)Google Scholar
- 8.Nisan, N.: Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. In: EC 2000: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Minneapolis, USA, pp. 1–12. ACM Press (2000)Google Scholar