Solids - A Combinatorial Auction for a Housing Corporation

  • Dries R. Goossens
  • Sander Onderstal
  • Frits C. R. Spieksma
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 80)


On May 7, 2011, over one hundred bidders took part in a combinatorial auction for housing space in a newly erected building in Amsterdam (the Netherlands). This paper describes the development of this auction. We sketch our collaboration with the housing corporation that resulted in design choices with respect to first/second price, feedback, number of rounds, and tractability of the combinatorial auction. Furthermore, the winner determination problem is complicated by various municipal and building regulations that the allocation needs to satisfy. We show how these regulations can be included in an integer program that is used to solve the winner determination problem. Finally, computational experiments illustrate the tractability of this model.


combinatorial auction housing auction design integer program 


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dries R. Goossens
    • 1
  • Sander Onderstal
    • 2
  • Frits C. R. Spieksma
    • 3
  1. 1.PostDoc researcher for Research Foundation - Flanders, Center for Operations Research and Business Statistics (ORSTAT), Faculty of Business and EconomicsKU LeuvenBelgium
  2. 2.University of AmsterdamThe Netherlands
  3. 3.Center for Operations Research and Business Statistics (ORSTAT), Faculty of Business and EconomicsKU LeuvenBelgium

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