What Are Computers (If They’re not Thinking Things)?

  • John Preston
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7318)

Abstract

Many of us now imagine that in the future humans either will, or at least could, ‘in theory’, construct an electronic digital computer which would really be a thinking thing. Alan Turing was one of the first and surely the most notable exponent of this view, and a significant proportion of his published work was devoted to arguing for it.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Preston
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of ReadingReadingUnited Kingdom

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