Handling Stateful Firewall Anomalies

  • Frédéric Cuppens
  • Nora Cuppens-Boulahia
  • Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro
  • Tarik Moataz
  • Xavier Rimasson
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT, volume 376)

Abstract

A security policy consists of a set of rules designed to protect an information system. To ensure this protection, the rules must be deployed on security components in a consistent and non-redundant manner. Unfortunately, an empirical approach is often adopted by network administrators, to the detriment of theoretical validation. While the literature on the analysis of configurations of first generation (stateless) firewalls is now rich, this is not the case for second and third generation firewalls, also known as stateful firewalls. In this paper, we address this limitation, and provide solutions to analyze and handle stateful firewall anomalies and misconfiguration.

Keywords

Boolean Function Stateful Rule Layer Protocol Passive Mode Tuple Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frédéric Cuppens
    • 1
  • Nora Cuppens-Boulahia
    • 1
    • 2
  • Joaquin Garcia-Alfaro
    • 1
  • Tarik Moataz
    • 1
  • Xavier Rimasson
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut Télécom, Télécom BretagneCesson-SévignéFrance
  2. 2.Swid Web Performance ServiceRennesFrance

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