A Semi-dynamic Evolutionary Power Control Game

  • Majed Haddad
  • Eitan Altman
  • Julien Gaillard
  • Dieter Fiems
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7290)


In this paper, we study a power control game over a collision channel. Each player has an energy state. When choosing a higher transmission power, the chances of a successful transmission (in the presence of other interference) increases at the cost of a larger decrease in the energy state of the battery. A central feature in these games is that of the limitation on battery life. Natural questions that arise concern the behavior of mobile users in the presence of interference. How should a mobile user behave given his initial energy state? We study this dynamic game when restricting to simple non dynamic strategies that consist on choosing a given power level that is maintained during the lifetime of the battery. We identify a surprising paradox which we call the Hawk and Dove resource abundance paradox.


Evolutionary game theory Hawk and Dove game Power control Battery life 


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Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Majed Haddad
    • 1
  • Eitan Altman
    • 2
  • Julien Gaillard
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dieter Fiems
    • 3
  1. 1.CERI/LIAUniversity of AvignonAvignonFrance
  2. 2.INRIA Sophia AntipolisSophia AntipolisFrance
  3. 3.SMACS Research Group, TELIN DepartmentGhent UniversityBelgium

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