Application of the Cournot and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Models for Mexican Real Estate Market

  • Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov
  • Daniel Flores Curiel
  • Javier González
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 15)

Abstract

This paper investigates the Mexican real estate market, especially the economy class homes. This sector plays an important role for Mexican social stability. Authors investigate the Cournot and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly models where there is a competition between a state-owned public firm maximizing domestic social surplus, and a private firm, which maximizes its own profit. Such models are used for modeling markets with low number of participants and high impact of government.

Keywords

Interest Rate Inflation Rate Private Firm Public Firm Inverse Demand Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vitaliy V. Kalashnikov
    • 1
  • Daniel Flores Curiel
    • 1
  • Javier González
    • 1
  1. 1.Univesidad Autonoma de Nueo Leon, Facultad de Economia, FE, UANLNuevo LeónMexico

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