Trust Extortion on the Internet

  • Audun Jøsang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7170)

Abstract

Dangers exist on the Internet in the sense that there are attackers who try to break into our computers or who in other ways try to trick us when we engage in online activities. In order to steer away from such dangers people tend to look for signals of security and trustworthiness when navigating the Internet and accessing remote hosts. Seen from an online service provider’s perspective it therefore is an essential marketing requirement to appear trustworthy, especially when providing sensitive or professional services. Said more directly, any perception of weak security or low trustworthiness could be disastrous for an otherwise secure and honest online service provider. In this context many security vendors offer solutions for strengthening security and trustworthiness. However there is also a risk that security vendors through their marketing strategy create an illusion that an online service provider which does not implement their solutions might therefore be insecure or untrustworthy. This would represent what we call trust extortion, because service providers are forced to implement specific security solutions to appear trustworthy although there might be alternative security solutions that provide equal or better security. We describe real examples where this seems to be the case. Trust extortion as a marketing strategy does not have to be explicit, but can be done very subtly e.g. through standardisation and industry fora, which then gives it a veil of legitimacy.

Keywords

Server Authentication Domain Name System Security Solution Direct Trust Transport Layer Security 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Audun Jøsang
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OsloNorway

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