Injection Technologies for Fault Attacks on Microprocessors

  • Alessandro Barenghi
  • Guido M. Bertoni
  • Luca Breveglieri
  • Mauro Pelliccioli
  • Gerardo Pelosi
Chapter
Part of the Information Security and Cryptography book series (ISC)

Abstract

The dependability of computing systems running cryptographic primitives is a critical factor for evaluating the practical security of any cryptographic scheme. Indeed, the observation of erroneous results produced by a computing device after the artificial injection of transient faults is one of the most effective side-channel attacks. This chapter reviews the (semi-)invasive fault injection techniques that have been successfully used to recover the secret parameters of a cryptographic component. Subsequently, a complete characterization of the fault model derived from the constant underfeeding of a general-purpose microprocessor is described, in order to infer how the faulty behavior causes exploitable software errors.

Keywords

Smart Card Clock Signal Fault Injection Probe Program Instruction Cache 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessandro Barenghi
    • 1
  • Guido M. Bertoni
    • 2
  • Luca Breveglieri
    • 1
  • Mauro Pelliccioli
    • 1
  • Gerardo Pelosi
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione (DEI)Politecnico di MilanoMilanItaly
  2. 2.STMicroelectronicsMilanItaly

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