Security of Symmetric Encryption in the Presence of Ciphertext Fragmentation

  • Alexandra Boldyreva
  • Jean Paul Degabriele
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
  • Martijn Stam
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7237)

Abstract

In recent years, a number of standardized symmetric encryption schemes have fallen foul of attacks exploiting the fact that in some real world scenarios ciphertexts can be delivered in a fragmented fashion. We initiate the first general and formal study of the security of symmetric encryption against such attacks. We extend the SSH-specific work of Paterson and Watson (Eurocrypt 2010) to develop security models for the fragmented setting. We also develop security models to formalize the additional desirable properties of ciphertext boundary hiding and robustness against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks for schemes in this setting. We illustrate the utility of each of our models via efficient constructions for schemes using only standard cryptographic components, including constructions that simultaneously achieve confidentiality, ciphertext boundary hiding and DoS robustness.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexandra Boldyreva
    • 1
  • Jean Paul Degabriele
    • 2
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
    • 2
  • Martijn Stam
    • 3
  1. 1.Georgia Institute of TechnologyUSA
  2. 2.Royal Holloway, University of LondonUK
  3. 3.University of BristolUK

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