Leakage-Resilient Circuits without Computational Assumptions

  • Stefan Dziembowski
  • Sebastian Faust
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7194)


Physical cryptographic devices inadvertently leak information through numerous side-channels. Such leakage is exploited by so-called side-channel attacks, which often allow for a complete security breache. A recent trend in cryptography is to propose formal models to incorporate leakage into the model and to construct schemes that are provably secure within them.

We design a general compiler that transforms any cryptographic scheme, e.g., a block-cipher, into a functionally equivalent scheme which is resilient to any continual leakage provided that the following three requirements are satisfied: (i) in each observation the leakage is bounded, (ii) different parts of the computation leak independently, and (iii) the randomness that is used for certain operations comes from a simple (non-uniform) distribution. In contrast to earlier work on leakage resilient circuit compilers, which relied on computational assumptions, our results are purely information-theoretic. In particular, we do not make use of public key encryption, which was required in all previous works.


Secret State Multiplication Gate Arithmetic Circuit Output Gate Cryptographic Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stefan Dziembowski
    • 1
    • 2
  • Sebastian Faust
    • 3
  1. 1.University of WarsawPoland
  2. 2.Sapienza University of RomeItaly
  3. 3.Aarhus UniversityDenmark

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