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Representation-Independent Data Usage Control

  • Alexander Pretschner
  • Enrico Lovat
  • Matthias Büchler
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7122)

Abstract

Usage control is concerned with what happens to data after access has been granted. In the literature, usage control models have been defined on the grounds of events that, somehow, are related to data. In order to better cater to the dimension of data, we extend a usage control model by the explicit distinction between data and representation of data. A data flow model is used to track the flow of data in-between different representations. The usage control model is then extended so that usage control policies can address not just one single representation (e.g., delete file1.txt after thirty days) but rather all representations of the data (e.g., if file1.txt is a copy of file2.txt, also delete file2.txt). We present three proof-of-concept implementations of the model, at the operating system level, at the browser level, and at the X11 level, and also provide an ad-hoc implementation for multi-layer enforcement.

Keywords

Policy Language Semantic Model System Layer Usage Control Policy Decision Point 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Pretschner
    • 1
  • Enrico Lovat
    • 1
  • Matthias Büchler
    • 1
  1. 1.Karlsruhe Institute of TechnologyGermany

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