Automated Verification of Equivalence Properties of Cryptographic Protocols

  • Rohit Chadha
  • Ştefan Ciobâcă
  • Steve Kremer
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7211)

Abstract

Indistinguishability properties are essential in formal verification of cryptographic protocols. They are needed to model anonymity properties, strong versions of confidentiality and resistance to offline guessing attacks, and can be conveniently modeled using process equivalences. We present a novel procedure to verify equivalence properties for bounded number of sessions. Our procedure is able to verify trace equivalence for determinate cryptographic protocols. On determinate protocols, trace equivalence coincides with observational equivalence which can therefore be automatically verified for such processes. When protocols are not determinate our procedure can be used for both under- and over-approximations of trace equivalence, which proved successful on examples. The procedure can handle a large set of cryptographic primitives, namely those which can be modeled by an optimally reducing convergent rewrite system. Although, we were unable to prove its termination, it has been implemented in a prototype tool and has been effectively tested on examples, some of which were outside the scope of existing tools.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rohit Chadha
    • 1
  • Ştefan Ciobâcă
    • 1
  • Steve Kremer
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.LSV, ENS Cachan & CNRS & INRIAFrance
  2. 2.INRIA Nancy - Grand-EstFrance

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