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A Formal Analysis of the Norwegian E-voting Protocol

  • Véronique Cortier
  • Cyrille Wiedling
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7215)

Abstract

Norway has used e-voting in its last political election in September 2011, with more than 25 000 voters using the e-voting option. The underlying protocol is a new protocol designed by the ERGO group, involving several actors (a bulletin box but also a receipt generator, a decryption service, and an auditor). Of course, trusting the correctness and security of e-voting protocols is crucial in that context. Formal definitions of properties such as privacy, coercion-resistance or verifiability have been recently proposed, based on equivalence properties.

In this paper, we propose a formal analysis of the protocol used in Norway, w.r.t. privacy, considering several corruption scenarios. Part of this study has conducted using the ProVerif tool, on a simplified model.

Keywords

e-voting privacy formal methods 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Véronique Cortier
    • 1
  • Cyrille Wiedling
    • 1
  1. 1.LORIA - CNRSNancyFrance

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