The PASSERINE Public Key Encryption and Authentication Mechanism

  • Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7127)


PASSERINE is a lightweight public key encryption mechanism which is based on a hybrid, randomized variant of the Rabin public key encryption scheme. Its design is targeted for extremely low-resource applications such as wireless sensor networks, RFID tags, embedded systems, and smart cards. As is the case with the Rabin scheme, the security of PASSERINE can be shown to be equivalent to factoring the public modulus. On many low-resource implementation platforms PASSERINE offers smaller transmission latency, hardware and software footprint and better encryption speed when compared to RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography. This is mainly due to the fact that PASSERINE implementations can avoid expensive big integer arithmetic in favor of a fully parallelizable CRT randomized-square operation. In order to reduce latency and memory requirements, PASSERINE uses Naccache-Shamir randomized multiplication, which is implemented with a system of simultaneous congruences modulo small coprime numbers. The PASSERINE private key operation is of comparable computational complexity to the RSA private key operation. The private key operation is typically performed by a computationally superior recipient such as a base station.


Rabin Cryptosystem Randomized Multiplication RFID Wireless Sensor Networks 


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Communications and NetworkingAalto UniversityAaltoFinland

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